





SDP RAM Report

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List of Abbreviations

Ai	Inherent Availability
CDR	Critical Design Review
CRT	Critical Repair Time
CSP	Central Signal Processor
FLOPS	Floating Point Operations per Second
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
HTEN	High Throughput Ethernet Network
ILS	Integrated Logistic Support
LLN	Low Latency Network
LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
MDT	Maintenance Down Time
MTBF	Mean Time Between Failures
MTTR	Mean Time to Repair
OT	Observing Time
PB	Petabyte (buffer capacity)
PSS	Pulsar Search
PST	Pulsar Timing
QA	Quality Assessment
RAM	Reliability, Availability & Maintainability
RBD	Reliability Block Diagram
SDP	Science Data Processor
SEI	Software Engineering Institute
ST	Standby Time

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of the Document

The Reliability, Availability & Maintainability (RAM) Requirements of the SDP are architectural drivers for the software and hardware design and selection. It also has a significant influence on capital and operational costs.

To support this design process and ensure compliance to Telescope Level Availability Requirements (section [3.1. L1 RAM Requirements](#)), work has been done to model and analyse the SDP availability problem. Availability depends on the Reliability and Maintainability of the System. So reference in this document to Availability includes both these concepts.

This document is intended for the following audience:

- SKAO and SDP RAM teams will use the report to check compliance of the design against L1 RAM requirements and Telescope level RAM budget allocations. As implementation detail becomes known or design changes are made, the underlying model will be used to assess the impact on the RAM.
- SDP System Engineering and Architecture teams may identify from this report further design drivers or lower level requirements. This report also serves as a tool to make trade-offs concerning the reliability and maintainability characteristics of the design. This report aids in ensuring that the focus, in terms of availability, is placed on the correct products.
- ILS and Operations teams, will use the initial results in their maintenance planning. They will give feedback on the feasibility of this report's maintainability estimations, and elaborate on the implementation thereof via SLAs and spares (which includes support delay estimations not covered in this document).

This work is modelled in a spreadsheet (section [4.3.1. RAM Model](#)). This document is a snapshot of the current state of the SDP design for SDP's pre-CDR milestone, understood through that model.

The Operations Plan [RD1] and SDP Architectural Overview and relevant view packets [AD4] provide detail on how these RAM allocations are met and what mitigations or recovery strategies are in place.

1.2. Scope

This document is within the scope of the SDP Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) Plan [RD3] and informs the SDP Operations Plan [RD1]. This document focuses on the inherent reliability of the design. The ILS looks at the bigger logistical picture to ensure the attributes of Availability, Maintainability and Supportability are supported.

This document addresses the RAM Analysis performed on SDP hardware and software.

1.3. RAM Definitions

The following definitions are important for the context of this document:

Term	Definition
Ai (Inherent Availability)	The probability that a system is operationally capable at any point in time when used in an ideal support environment, i.e. one in which repair commences instantaneously upon failure. Allocated to SDP in [AD1]. This is the primary focus of the availability analysis.
Ao (Operational Availability)	The probability that a system is operationally capable at any point in time when used in a realistic support environment, i.e., one in which repair cannot commence until some time after the failure has occurred. It is thus a measure of not only reliability and maintainability, but also of the response time of the support system. Allocated only to the Telescope, allocated to SDP in terms of MDT.
Critical Functions	A function that, if defective or unavailable, will result in the telescope not being available (i.e. Telescope not available, failed observation or a revised observation schedule).
Critical Failures	A failure which may cause injury, damage, or the telescope not being available. A critical failure in this context also includes failures which may result in loss of redundancy or degradation, and if not detected or repaired could result in the telescope not being available.
Critical Repair Time	Time to repair critical failures. It excludes preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance on non-critical items. It also excludes support delays.
Direct Maintenance Hours	Time for all, scheduled and unscheduled, on-equipment maintenance. Exclude administrative and Supply Chain hours. DMH provides a measure of the maintenance personnel hours required on-site. It is limited to on-equipment maintenance.
Fault Isolation	The ability to find the root cause of a fault, by isolating the LRUs whose operational mode is not nominal.
Fault Detection	The ability to detect malfunctions in real time, as soon and as surely as possible.
Component	In the SEI context components are referred to as runtime components, and therefore have a closer relationship to typical

	<p>System Engineering “functions” than to Systems Engineering “components”.</p> <p>Components are implemented by products. Products can be hardware products or software modules.</p>
Reliability	The probability that an item can perform its intended function for a specified interval under stated conditions.
Maintainability ¹	The measure of the ability of an item to be retained in or restored to a specified condition, when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels using prescribed procedures and resources at each level of maintenance and repair.
MTBF	<p>Mean Time Between Failures is a probabilistic failure prediction of the up time between failures. MTBF is only valid for the "useful life period", which is characterized by a relatively constant failure rate (the middle part of the "bathtub curve", between burn-in and wear-out failure rates).</p> <p>MTBF should not be confused with the expected life of a component.</p>

Other Important RAM terms are Direct Maintenance Hours (DMH) and Full-time Employee (FTE). These terms are discussed discussed in the ILS Document [RD3].

¹ This document only includes MTTR/CRT, the rest of this concept is discussed as part of the ILS Document [RD3]

2. References

2.1. Applicable Documents

The following documents are applicable to the extent stated herein. In the event of conflict between the contents of the applicable documents and this document, **the applicable documents** shall take precedence.

Reference Number	Reference
[AD1]	SKA RAM Allocation SKA-TEL-SKO-0000102 Rev 03
[AD2]	SDP L2 Requirements, SKA-TEL-SDP-0000033, Rev 02E
[AD3]	SKA Phase 1 System Requirements Specification SKA-TEL-SKO-0000008, Rev 11
[AD4]	SDP Architecture Documentation, SKA-TEL-SDP-0000013
[AD5]	Platform focused workshop and Architectural Decision: Compute Islands are a platform concern

2.2. Reference Documents

The following documents are referenced in this document. In the event of conflict between the contents of the referenced documents and this document, **this document** shall take precedence.

Reference Number	Reference
[RD1]	Operations Plan, SKA-TEL-SDP-0000081 Rev 2
[RD2]	SDP RBD Spreadsheet
[RD3]	ILS Document SKA-TEL-SDP-0000050 Rev 3
[RD4]	SDP Memo 43 Pulsar Timing Failure Analysis Rev C
[RD5]	RAM Analysis v1
[RD6]	Practical Reliability (4 th Edition), Patrick D.T. O' Connor, published by Wiley, ISBN 0470844620 (HB) 0470844639 (PB)
[RD7]	ReliaWiki
[RD8]	SKA-TEL-SDP-0000043, SDP Cost Model

3. RAM analysis methodology

The methodology, as described in Figure 1, was followed for the SDP RAM analysis.




Figure 1: SDP RAM analysis methodology

3.1. RBD

A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a graphical representation of the reliability characteristics of elements in a system. It defines the critical path for the system to function. If any component is in a failed state, it would mean that one or more paths are broken. Therefore in a serial configuration, each or any element can bring about system failure. In a parallel configuration there is some redundancy, as the path can continue through another element.

3.2. Equations

Equations exist for the various serial and parallel configurations [RD6,RD7]:

- Inherent Availability (A_i) using MTTR and MTBF

$$A_i = \frac{MTBF}{MTBF+MTTR} \quad \text{[Equation 1]}$$

- Inherent Availability (A_i) using Critical Repair Time (CRT), Observing (OT), Standby (ST) (not used)

$$A_i = \frac{OT+ST}{OT+ST+CRT} \quad \text{[Equation 2]}$$

- Operational Availability (A_o) using Observing (OT), Standby (ST), Engineering Maintenance and Critical Maintenance (CMT) (not used)

$$A_o = \frac{OT+ST}{OT+ST+MT+CMT} \quad \text{[Equation 3]}$$

- Availability in serial configuration

$$A_{i_{tot}} = \prod_{n=1}^N A_{i_n} \quad \text{[Equation 4]}$$

- Availability in parallel configuration, equal individual A_i

$$A_{i_{tot}} = 1 - \prod_{n=1}^N (1 - A_{i_n}) \quad \text{[Equation 5]}$$

- Availability with K out of N redundancy, equal individual A_i (probability of k or more success out of n trials)

$$A_{i_{tot}}(k, N, A_i) = \sum_{r=k}^N \binom{N}{r} A_i^r (1 - A_i)^{N-r} \quad \text{[Equation 6]}$$

N is the total number of elements in parallel.
k is the minimum number of elements required for successful operation of the system.
N-k therefore translates to the number of redundant elements / spare capacity.

3.3. Ai Allocation Strategies

Various strategies can be used to determine the Ai of elements in the RBD. Some examples:

- Equal allocation to all elements in the RBD
- Estimate achieved Ai of known elements
- Minimised allocation for some elements
- Maximised allocation for some elements
- A combination of the ones listed above

These strategies can be used to assess the impact of changes on the total Ai, or to perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact on a specific product.

Refer to Section 4 for more details on how Ai is interpreted for SDP.

3.3.1. Chosen Allocation Strategy

For hardware it is possible to estimate an Achieved Ai, as failure rates and MTBF data are available. Therefore in [5.4. Step 4: Modelling the Ai](#), the Estimated Achieved Ai is calculated for all the hardware products using the assumed input variables in Table 7.

It is difficult to estimate the reliability of software modules, in particular if the software has not yet been implemented. Therefore Ai is allocated to software modules, after taking into account the estimated achieved Ai of the hardware products in the RBD. The remaining Ai is allocated to software modules, according to their criticality (section [5.5.4. Software Components](#)).

As the SDP architecture and design matures and evolves or new information becomes available, the allocation strategy will need to be re-evaluated and optimised.

3.4. Software Reliability

RAM analyses are typically applied on hardware. It is important to note that the goal with including the software in the RAM analysis, is to understand the impact the availability requirements have on the software in terms of an estimate failure rate and failure recovery times. It is not an in depth analysis of all software modules. By stating that some are more critical than others, one simply gets a grasp on ranges of failure rates. The allocation method could vary with the course of software development, changing the corresponding percentages allocated to that component. The software part of this analysis however provides us with an general understanding of failure rate and recovery times required within the total SDP context. More in depth Software Analysis could be done with Quality Attribute Scenarios and Failure Mode Analysis [5.6. Step 5: Follow-up action](#).

4. SDP RAM Context

4.1. L1 RAM Requirements

The following L1 RAM requirements [AD3] are allocated to SDP²:

Table 1: L1 Requirements

REQ ID	Name	Description
SKA1-SYS_REQ-3245	Inherent availability	The SKA1_Mid ³ shall have an Inherent Availability of more than 99%
SKA1-SYS_REQ-2716	Operational availability	The SKA1_Mid and SKA1_Low shall each have an operational availability of at least 95%.
SKA1-SYS_REQ-3247	Software updates	SKA1_Low and SKA1_Mid equipment shall facilitate updates of major software updates within the system availability allocations.
SKA1-SYS_REQ-3276	SKA1_Low maintenance hours	The SKA1_Low shall require less than 1600 Direct Maintenance Hours per month.
SKA1-SYS_REQ-3246	SKA1_Mid maintenance hours	The SKA1_Mid shall require less than 1600 Direct Maintenance Hours per month.
SKA1-SYS_REQ-3249	Testability	SKA1_Low and SKA1_Mid shall each test (for), detect, isolate and report failures to the operational and maintenance personnel. SKA1_Mid shall detect more than 99% of all Critical Failures. SKA1_Mid shall isolate and log more than 95% of all failures down to a LRU level.

4.2. SKA RAM Allocation to SDP

Along with the L1 Requirements, the RAM budget allocations performed at Telescope level [AD1], provides further context for this RAM analysis. Table 2 summarises the current allocation to SDP.

A direct Ai allocation to SDP is provided. There is no direct Ao allocation to SDP, but SDP's Maintenance Down Time (Table 2), together with all downtimes of other subsystems is constraint by the Telescope Ao of 95% (Equation 3).

² Other maintainability L1 requirements relating to maintenance design & installation, are addressed in ILS Document [RD3]

³ This requirement is intended for Low as well. The text should be updated by SKAO

The work performed for this report, feeds back into the Telescope Level RAM analysis and RBD done by SKAO.

Table 2: SDP RAM Allocation

Attribute	Value	L2 Requirement & Comment
Ai	99.9 %	SDP_REQ-762: SDP Inherent Availability (Ai) The SDP shall have an Inherent Availability (Ai) higher than or equal to 99.9%.
CRT	2 hours ⁴	Not addressed in L2 yet. Equation 1 using MTTR and MTBF was used for determining Ai and not Equation 2. MTTR is a derivative of Ai requirement and an L2 was not yet formalised. In Table 7, one can see it is often a “sliding” variable (in red).
Maintenance Down Time	2 hours	The System shall be designed not to require software and hardware maintenance down time, in excess of 2 hours per year. (during steady state operations) Also see: SDP_REQ-759 SDP Software update downtime The SDP shall not require the telescope to be offline while performing software updates. Major software updates shall be performed during engineering and maintenance down time periods of the telescope. Rationale: Software updates that require downtime are to be done during planned Maintenance Downtime periods for the telescopes. Planned Maintenance Downtime is expected to be 3% per year according to SKA RAM Allocation (SKA-TEL-SKO-0000102) Rev 03.

4.3. L2 RAM Requirements

L2 Requirements were derived from L1 Requirements and RAM budget allocations as discussed in the sections above. The following L2 RAM requirements [AD2] are included in our current baseline. These requirements are listed below, but are discussed at the relevant places in the document:

- SDP_REQ-762: SDP Inherent Availability (Ai) - [SKA RAM Allocation to SDP](#)
- SDP_REQ-763: SDP Critical failure identification - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-764: SDP Isolation of critical failures - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-822: Node failures recovery - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-821: Failure detection to Achieve Ai - [4.6. Step 5: Recommended action](#)
- SDP_REQ-823: Failure Prevention - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-825: Monitoring to prevent critical failures - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)

⁴ In discussion with SKAO w.r.t to this allocation. 2 hours is not achievable.

- SDP_REQ-4: SDP Resource Reporting - [SDP RAM Analysis](#)
- SDP_REQ-30: Graceful degradation - [Step 1: Failure Analysis](#), [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-810: Maintainability of Software - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-814: Level of Monitoring - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-811: Usability of SDP hardware - [Step 5: Follow-up action](#)
- SDP_REQ-759: SDP Software update downtime - [SKA RAM Allocation to SDP](#)
- SDP_REQ-739: Pipeline maintenance usability - not addressed in this document
- SDP_REQ-818: Software Reboot Time - [Software Components](#)
- SDP_REQ-819: Software Maximum Allowable Recovery Time - [Software Components](#)

5. SDP RAM Analysis

“Aperture synthesis telescopes are inherently robust. Their failure modes are not critical, and a large fraction of the telescope can be unavailable, yet the telescope is still capable of performing valuable observations.”

The quotation above from [AD1] aimed at Telescope Availability, holds true for the SDP, where large portions of the processing capability may be unavailable and yet the SDP can be available to the Telescope. Therefore it is important to understand the following axioms for SDP unavailability:

- SDP is considered unavailable, when SDP is unavailable to the telescope for the scheduled observation.
- SDP may have several components in a failed state, while still being available.
- An important distinction exists between SDP availability and SDP resource availability. The following SDP resource levels [Processing system units of control, AD4] are continually reported to the Telescope Manager [SDP_REQ-4]:
 - ❑ Real-time compute (FLOPS)
 - ❑ Batch processing (offline) compute (FLOPS)
 - ❑ Buffer capacity (PB)

Consider these 2 scenarios:

1. SDP has resources available, but there is a critical failure resulting in the loss of a scheduled observation.
2. SDP has no resources available for Telescope Manager to schedule observations, yet SDP itself isn't experiencing any critical failures.

For these reasons, the topic of resource availability and scheduling should be seen as outside the scope of the RAM Analysis. The RAM analysis focuses on a failure resulting in a failed or delayed observation, or the Telescope being offline due to the SDP. The current concept for the SDP's response to failure vs lack of resources also differs. Failures, as discussed in this document, result in a change of SDP or SDP sub-level state, while lack of resources results in an alarm [Operational System C&C View, AD4].

- While the SDP is available, some failures may result in degraded science output. The telescope is busy observing, but the science output is of an unacceptable quality. Science time could be lost, so by definition it leads to unavailability. Telescope Manager is however informed on quality metrics of an observation, and subsequently could cancel the observation. Reporting on quality metrics is therefore essential for reliability and availability. An unavailable component relating to Quality Assessment would however not cause the observation to be aborted immediately. The components relating to Quality Assessment is therefore not regarded as critical in this analysis. Further definition of the reliability of

quality metrics to Telescope Manager is important and should be done (section [6. Non-critical elements](#)).

The steps as described in section [3. RAM analysis methodology](#), were followed and discussed in the sections below.

5.1. Step 1: Failure Analysis

In order to have critical failures, it is necessary to understand what primary functions are required for a given operation. The two primary functions required of the SDP are:

1. Receive
2. Real-Time Processing

Naturally, a total failure of the SDP to provide a platform or execute control would lead to both of these functions failing. Buffer failure would also lead to the failure of these two functions.

5.2. Step 2: Critical Components

The Operational System C&C View [AD4], describes the SDP architecturally significant functionality in a run-time component view. This view is suited to analysing the availability characteristics of the architectural design. These run-time components are implemented through software modules as documented in the SDP Architecture Overview Document [AD4]. The hardware analysis is done on hardware products, but for the software analysis, it proved more valuable at this point in time to keep the analysis on the components level. The rationale for that follows:

- At the time of writing this report, the SDP design focus was on concluding the SDP Architecture for CDR.
- Components show more complex interactions, and therefore failures w.r.t those interactions can be better understood through analysing it on component level. These failures are more relevant at this point in time than for example failures in line of code (modules).
- This also supports the application of reliability tactics relevant to architecture to be employed e.g. decoupling of subcomponents [Operational System C&C View, AD4] etc.
- In understanding criticality as defined in the section above, modules may serve to be a tricky concept. Components are implemented through modules, but a module may have critical elements and non-critical elements. The same module may even be critical to some modules in some instance, while not critical to others.
- More emphases could be placed on failure analysis of modules in later phases when code construction is taking place.

Figure 2 below shows the critical run-time components of the SDP:




Figure 2: Critical components (for SDP availability) of the SDP Operational System C&C View [AD4] are shown highlighted in red.

The following run-time components are critical for SDP availability:

- Execute Control
- Data Queues,
- Receive & Real-time processing
- Buffer
- Platform⁵

Note: Non-critical components may have important constraints in preventing non-critical failures from becoming critical failures. This is discussed in section [6. Non-critical elements](#).

The hardware products required for these components are depicted in Table 3.

⁵ Shown in Execution Control presentation in the SDP Operational System C&C view [RD05].

Table 3: Component to Product Mapping

Hardware Products	Execution Control	Data Queues	Receive & Real-Time Processing	Buffer
Compute Rack (service Nodes)	x	x		
Compute Rack			x	x
Management Network	x	x	x	x
High throughput Ethernet Network			x	x
Low Latency Network		x	x	x

5.3. Step 3: Reliability Block Diagram

The products and components can now be arranged as elements in a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD). The RBD is shown in Figure 3 below. In Table 4, each RBD element is explained along with its availability strategy.

Intra-Rack Infrastructure and Rack Infrastructure, cabling and power distribution are assumed as $A_i = 1$ and not further developed under RBD elements.

SDP Critical Components RBD




Figure 3: SDP RBD

Table 5: RBD Elements

HW Products & SW Components	Description & Availability Strategy
Management Network Core Switch	Inside the Interconnect System Rack ⁶ , is the Management Network Core Switch. All Compute Racks are connected to the Management Network through this switch. The Top of Rack Switches, are included in the Compute Rack's A _i . The Management Network Core Switch has a redundant topology.
1st stage Switches High Throughput Ethernet Network to CSP	Each switch is a single point failure for those fixed lines from CSP. No rerouting is possible. Incoming visibility data carried by the associated SaDT links from CSP will be lost until repair. All switches are therefore in series leading to unavailability.
2nd Stage Switches for the High Throughput Ethernet Network	These switches are housed inside the Interconnect System Rack, and connect several Compute Racks to the High Throughput Ethernet Network. The Top of Rack Switches, are included in the Compute Rack's A _i .

⁶ The Rack which houses all the core switches, see PBS in Hardware Decomposition View [AD4]

	<p>Upon failure of these switches, rerouting can take place. The network will still be available, but with reduced bandwidth.</p>
Low Latency Network Core Switches	<p>These switches are housed inside the Interconnect System Rack, and connect several Compute Racks to the Low Latency Network. The Top of Rack Switches, are included in the Compute Rack's Ai. Upon failure of these switches, rerouting can take place. The network will still be available, but with reduced bandwidth.</p>
Compute Rack	<p>An important architectural decision [AD5] was made that different types of nodes will be differentiated on a platform level and not on hardware level. In other words, hardware can be dedicated by Platform Service (discussed on the following page) to become hardware available for a certain type of resource pool. However, at the hardware level, hardware is still procured [RD8] to be optimised for certain functions.</p> <p>A Compute Rack includes nodes with one or more, of 4 specific capabilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Nodes optimised for low latency ● Nodes optimised for high throughput (e.g. containing GPUs) ● Service Nodes ● Storage Nodes <p>This architecture supports a K out of N redundancy (Equation 6) for the nodes (servers), which means all nodes aren't in parallel, but SDP will still be available if some of the nodes (N-K) fail.</p> <p>During previous versions of the RAM Analysis [RD5] the concept of 1 Hot Spare Compute Rack per Telescope was evaluated and found to be sufficient for the total availability. This serves as an input assumption for this analysis.</p> <p>The Compute Rack also includes other components such as the HTE and LLN switches. See Figure 4 for more detail.</p>
Platform Services	<p>Platform Services is required for application level software to execute. Platform services is responsible for presenting shared services to the wider SDP software stack. For example, the Core Infrastructure Services component presents the SDP hardware as a Software Defined Datacenter, i.e. control the compute, storage and networking hardware delivering the expected System Services as required [Platform C&C View, AD4].</p> <p>Unavailability of Platform Services would result in SDP to be unavailable as defined in this analysis. This component is therefore a single point failure for the SDP and requires high availability.⁷</p>

⁷ SDP_REQ-030 states that there should not be any single point failures in the system.

Execution Control	<p>Execution Control is expected to become active once the platform has minimal resources available to provide the necessary compute and database infrastructure.</p> <p>Although high levels of decoupling are achieved in the general architecture, the SDP Component State Dependencies diagram in the Operational System C&C View [AD4] shows that the only runtime component whose failed state would result in unavailability of all other critical components is Execution Control. Execution Control (component) is a potential Single Point Failure⁸. This component so be designed for a higher Ai.</p> <p>Current architectural strategies employed include hierarchically splitting up control between different controller components, so reducing the complexity that every single controller component has to handle, limiting the extent of failures. Given current architectural solutions, the Configuration Database will remain a critical point of failure, which could result in entire system shut down. High availability off-the-shelf databases are available for the Configuration Database. [Operational System C&C View, AD4]</p>
Receive and Real-time processing	<p>The Receive Component handles data from the Central Signal Processor and the Low Frequency Aperture Array while the observation is running. Multiple instances of Receive might be active at the same time in case multiple types of observations are running and/or the telescope is split into sub-arrays.</p> <p>Handling the received data consists of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Writing received and possibly pre-processed measurement data to the Buffer for later Batch Processing 2. Feeding it directly to Real-Time Processing, such as a fast imaging or real-time calibration solving Science Pipeline Workflows. Real-time results of such processing pipelines are pushed out via Data Queues and might lead to e.g. alerts or calibration solutions getting published back to the Telescope Manager. <p>[Operational System C&C View, AD4]</p>
Buffer	<p>The Buffer stores and makes available primary inputs and outputs of processing using a file system interface. Storage will consist of multiple tiers (such as a "Hot" and a "Cold" Buffer storage tier) to provide storage at different sizing and performance requirements. The Buffer will have the capability to handle the data life cycle of stored objects [Operational System C&C View, AD4].</p>

⁸ SDP_REQ-030 states that there should not be any single point failures in the system.

Data Queues

The Data Queues component handles medium-rate real-time information such as calibration solutions, alerts or Quality Assessment data exchanged between model databases, processing and Quality Assessment. The Data Queues component also supports sharing of intermediate processing results such as global calibration solutions between Execution Engine instances [Operational System C&C View, AD4].

5.3.1. RAM Model

Using the logic of the RBD and the underlying equations (section [3.2. Equations](#)), a model [RD2] was developed. The idea of the model is that any variables (e.g. MTTR, MTBF, Ai allocated, N, K etc) can be changed to assess the impact on Ai or another variable under investigation. The model was built in a spreadsheet.

5.4. Step 4: Modelling the Ai

The model [RD2] reflects values for SKA1_Mid and SKA1_Low (which are very similar). Only SKA1_Mid is discussed in this report.

List of assumptions for the Model

- Calculations were done in double precision and shown in 8 digits (0.99999999) (TBC)
- The Input Variable (green) MTBF are assumptions based on industry expert opinions
- Spares for Network components are currently estimated at 10% vs 1% for Compute Rack components [RD8].
- Rerouting of all switches is possible, except for the 1st stage High Throughput Ethernet Switches (product 2) which are Single Point Failures.
- For network switches with K out of N redundancy (Equation 6), spare capacity (N-K), was assumed to be 1 (further discussion in [5.5.1. Network Core Switches](#)).
- N, the total number of Network Core switches (product 1, 4) is taken from the current Cost Model [RD8] for the LLN. The 1:1 oversubscriptions values are used for switches.

Table 6: Key for Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 & Table 12

Input Variable
Sliding Variable
Output Variable
Selected option in bold

Table 7: Selected Allocation Strategy with values (hardware)

#	Product	Allocation Strategy	Ai	MTBF (hours)	MTTR (hours)	N ⁹	k ¹⁰	N-k ¹¹
1	Management Network Core	Estimated Achieved, Equation 1&5	0.99999996	200000	8	8	7	1
2	1st stage HT Ethernet Network (CSP)	Estimated Achieved, Equation 1	0.99996000	200000	8			
3	2nd stage HT Ethernet Network	Estimated Achieved, Equation 1&5	0.99999989	200000	8	12	11	1
4	Low-latency network core switches	Estimated Achieved, Equation 1&5	0.99999996	200000	8	8	7	1
5	Compute Racks	Estimated Achieved with 1 Hot Spare per Telescope, Equation 1, 4, 5	0.99997464	Table 9				
6	Software	Remaining Ai, Equation 4	0.99906535	Table 12				
	SDP Total Ai		0.999					

5.5. Product Discussion

5.5.1. Network Core Switches

Network Core Switches as described in Product 1, 3 & 4, have a similar topology. Although N is different for each of these networks and also Mid and Low Telescopes, what we learned from the model for these 3 sets of network switches are similar, as described below:

- High Availability** | Given the topology of these networks, they are inherently highly available. Even with very low numbers of K, the network will be available. Therefore for our analysis K rather relates to an acceptable bandwidth.
 For the purposes of a sensitivity analysis, let's assume Ai = 0.99999999 to see what the effect is on other variables.

⁹ N, total number of units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹⁰ k, number of units that must be available, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹¹ N-k, number of redundant units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

- **Ai optimised for lowest N** | we need to lower our MTTR (e.g. 2 hours) in order to meet $A_i = 0.99999999$.
- **Ai optimised for higher MTTR** | If we can assume that 2 switches in a failed state ($N-k = 2$) would still provide sufficient bandwidth, then we can relax the MTTR values towards 2-5 days¹² (Table 8).
- **Over-design** | Cost trade-off is always a driver. Care should be taken that networks are not over-designed. If $(N-k) = 2$ provides a sufficient bandwidth, the ability to have more than 2 switches in a failed state or repair it in a critical time, would result in higher cost, but would make no difference to improve availability. The model could further assist in analysing such trade-offs.

Table 8: Sliding Variables for Network Switches

#	Product	Allocation Strategy	A_i	MTBF (hours)	MTTR (hours)	N^{13}	k^{14}	$N-k^{15}$
3	2nd stage HT Ethernet Network	Estimated Achieved Equation 1&4	0.99999989	200000	8	12	11	1
			0.99999999		2		11	1
			0.99999999		60		10	2
4	Low-latency network core switches	Estimated Achieved Equation 1&4	0.99999999	200000	8	8	7	1
			0.99999999		3		7	1
			0.99999999		120		6	2

5.5.2. Stage 1 High Throughput Ethernet Network Switches

Stage 1 High Throughput Ethernet Network Switches (Product 2) is different from the other switch configurations, in that no rerouting can take place. For the period until a switch has been repaired, the data carried by the associated SaDT links from CSP will be lost, and hence the SDP would be unavailable for that observation. It would make sense for MTTR to be a driver for the availability of these switches. For the basic analysis it was assumed that MTTR = 8 hours. The feasibility of a lower MTTR and sufficient spares is more important for this product than for the other network products. Although the current analysis shows compliance to the SDP $A_i = 99.9\%$, improvements in this area would have a positive impact on total availability. An MTTR = 2 hours would result in an $A_i = 0.99999000$ in comparison to the A_i reported in Table 7 of $A_i = 0.99996000$.

¹² MTTR is not equal to a SLA as MTTR excludes administration and supply chain hours

¹³ N, total number of units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹⁴ k, number of units that must be available, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹⁵ N-k, number of redundant units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

5.5.3. Compute Racks

Compute Racks¹⁶ (Product 5) are in a k out of N Redundancy (Equation 6), which means that k Compute Racks must be online to meet the demand. K is fixed from the estimated design, but N will then be determined as k + hot spares. To estimate that, we need to have an estimation of an actual individual Compute Rack. That can be estimated by looking at the RBD for a Compute Rack. Figure 4 shows the RBD for a Compute Rack.




Figure 4: Compute Rack RBD

5.5.3.1. Assumptions and Rationale for Compute Rack RBD:

- There is spare capacity on the Buffer (Compute Rack). Batch processing could be delayed, while only Real-Time Processing continues.
- During processing, upon failure of a node, it is possible to carry on the processing on another node.
- The combination of the Compute Rack's infrastructure, cabling and power distribution can be assumed as $A_i = 1$. Redundancy exist for Power Supply.
- Computes Nodes (servers) are effectively in parallel, as processing can be allocated to any other node. This will also result in the group Compute Nodes having a $A_i = 1$. Service Nodes (type of server) are not in K out of N redundancy where $K = 14$ and $N = 28$. This also results in $A_i = 1$.
- Compute Rack ToR Switches are included in the Compute Rack's A_i .
- The MTTR for the Buffer, was an estimate. The hardware implementation is still conceptual. Therefore the general assumed MTBF i for this item is left as is. Further analysis for trade-offs can be done using the model.
- One of the questions to be answered in the RAM analysis is how many spare Compute Islands are required to meet the availability requirement for the block of Compute Islands. During initial RAM analysis, it was found that one can achieve sufficient availability with 1 Hot spare per telescope. The analysis therefore continues with that as an assumption.

¹⁶ Previously referred to as Compute Island

Table 9: Selected Allocation Strategy with values (Compute Rack)

#	Product	Allocation Strategy	Ai	MTBF (hours)	MTTR (hours)	N ¹⁷	k ¹⁸	N-k ¹⁹
5.1	ToR Management Switch	Equation 1	0.99999996	200000	8	1		
5.2	ToR LLN Switch	Equation 1	0.99996000	200000	8	1		
5.3	ToR HTEN Switch	Equation 1	0.99999989	200000	8	1		
5.4	Servers	Equation 5	1	Ai of individual server 0.9997270		56		
5.5	Buffer Storage (conceptual)	Equation 1	0.9998400	50000	8			
5.6	Infrastructure, Cabling, power Distribution	Assumed	1					
	Single Compute Rack Ai	Equation 4	0.9997201					
	Compute Racks Total Ai	Equation 6	0.99997464			26	25	1

If the number of redundant units, $(N-k) = 2$, then Compute Racks as a whole would achieve an $A_i = 1$. However, there is no need to achieve that, and the current A_i serves to be sufficient to meet our SDP A_i of 99.9%.

Further analysis and trade-offs could be performed on the Buffer.

5.5.4. Software Components

Since we have no reliability data for Software, the A_i remaining (RAi) after taking the hardware into consideration was divided between the software components. The remaining A_i was then divided according to the ranking in Table 10 and Equation 7. This weighting scheme was assumed to be a sensible way to proceed without detailed software module specific information, according to the chosen weight (that can be varied in the model [RD2]).

¹⁷ N, total number of units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹⁸ k, minimum number of units that must be available, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

¹⁹ N-k, number of redundant units, for k out of N redundancy Equation 6

Table 10 list the components in order of criticality and assigns a priority weight to it.

Table 10: Weighting for software allocation

Software module	Rationale for ranking	Ranking (W)
Platform	Without platform no higher level software components can be active.	1
Execution Control	If Execution Control is down, all other components are also unavailable.	1
Receive and real-time processing	This component is required to ingest data and perform time-critical processing.	2
Buffer	This component is required to ingest data for later processing, therefore making it possible to still observe, even though resources are unavailable or other non-critical components are down.	2
Data Queues	Data Queues is required to perform real-time calibration and it does not affect other areas of SDP in terms of Ai.	3
Total number (N)		8

$$Allocated Ai = RAi^{\frac{W}{N}} \quad [Equation 7]$$

W is the weighting according to Table 10

N is the sum of all the weightings

RAi is the remaining Ai budget to be allocated to software

$$RAi = \frac{0.999}{\prod Hardware Ai}$$

The use of the software analysis is that for a given allocated Ai, a failure rate can be obtained. This allocation may change throughout design and construction. This initial estimate is just to aid in understanding the required software availability. Allowable failure rates (per year) go hand in hand with the selected MTTR (Equation 1). For analysis purposes and for discussion, the following initial 3 failure recover types and repair times have been defined. These 3 failure recover types and repair times have all been modelled (Table 12) for understanding the software's availability requirement.

Table 11: Types of repair times for software

Failure recovery type (SW)	Description of recovery type	Repair time
Reboot / Restart	Automated failure recovery where the node is rebooted or application software is restarted by Platform Services, e.g. when a node or software becomes unresponsive.	10 min (TBC)
Rollback or other automated recovery mechanism	Automated rollback to a previously known working version (deployment) of software.	2 hours (TBC)
Manual intervention	Manual intervention is required to roll back software to a known working state or implement a workaround to prevent the failure re-occurring while cause of the failure is resolved.	8 hours (TBC)

Table 12: Selected Allocation Strategy with values (software)

#	Component	Allocation Strategy	W^{20}	A_i	MTBF (hours)	MTTR (hours)	Critical Failures (per year)
6	Platform Services	Allocated with weighting, Equation 1	1	0.99988312	1454	10 min	6
					17110	2 h	0.5
					68439	8 h	0.1
7	Execution Control	Allocated with weighting, Equation 1	1	0.99988312	1454	10 min	6
					17110	2 h	0.5
					68439	8 h	0.1
8	Receive & Real-time processing	Allocated with weighting Equation 1	1	0.99988312	1454	10 min	6
					17110	2 h	0.5
					68439	8 h	0.1
9	Buffer	Allocated with Equation 1	2	0.99976625	727	10 min	12
					8554	2 h	1
					34217	8 h	0.3
10	Data Queues	Allocated with Equation 1	3	0.99964940	485	10 min	18.1

²⁰ Weighting as allocated per Table 10

				5703	2 h	1.5
				22810	8 h	0.4
Total Software	Reboot/Restart				10 min	48.2
	Rollback				2h	4.1
	Manual intervention				8h	1

Note: It is important to emphasise that the figures in Table 12 relate to critical failures which result in SDP not being available, i.e. 48 restarts per year for critical failures and not 48 restarts per year in total.

From Table 12 it is clear that the majority of software failures should be recoverable by the first failure recovery type (rebooting / restarting).

These are estimates and do not trace from L1 requirements. L2 requirements have been generated for the software recovery times:

Table 13: L2 requirements for software recovery times

REQ ID	Name	Description
SDP_REQ-81 8	Software Reboot Time	Software failures of the SDP (TBC-084) software that requires rebooting in order to recover from the failure, shall have a MTTR (recover time) of less than or equal to 10 minutes.
SDP_REQ-81 9	Software Maximum Allowable Recovery Time	Software failures of the SDP (TBC-0085) software that require a software fix, shall fall back on to a previous working state or isolate the problem in such a way to achieve a MTTR (recovery time) of less than or equal to TBD (>10 mins <<8h) minutes.

Further discussion on ongoing work for software in section [5.6. Step 5: Follow-up action](#).

These run-time components are implemented through software modules as shown in [AD4].

5.6. Step 5: Follow-up action

The following recommendations are made for the design:

- Ai = 1 for elements in the Interconnect System can easily be achieved. Care should however be taken in not over designing this element from an availability point of view.
- Confirm what is a sufficient N-K for the Interconnect System Rack Switches [drawing in Hardware Decomposition View, AD4], w.r.t acceptable bandwidth.

- The Single Point Failures in the High Throughput Ethernet Network could be considered for improvement.
- As the Compute Rack's buffer design becomes more detailed, this could be analysed in more detail and a margin for acceptable MTBFs considered.
- Software stakeholders to consider the feasibility of these first order failure rate values.
- The software MTTRs to be finalised.
- Software RAM work to continue in the form of failure analysis (FMECAs e.g. RD4), including failure handling mechanisms, failure recovery strategies and monitoring. The following L2 requirements are also applicable in Table 14.

Table 14: L2 requirements for failure identification

REQ ID	Name	Description	Comment
SDP_REQ-763	SDP Critical failure identification	The SDP shall identify more than 99% of all critical failures and report them to the TM.	
SDP_REQ-764	SDP Isolation of critical failures	The SDP shall isolate 95% of all critical failures and report it to TM.	
SDP_REQ-821	Failure detection to Achieve Ai	The SDP shall detect failures to allow recovery within the time windows specified in SDP_REQ-818 and SDP_REQ-819.	SDP_REQ-763 is about identification of critical failures and communicating it to TM. This requirement is for detection of other failures to allow SDP to achieve the Ai specified.
SDP_REQ-823	Failure Prevention	The SDP shall monitor specific variables (as identified by failure analysis / FMECA) that allow detection of critical failures before they occur to allow preventative maintenance or actions (i.e. change in processing schedule).	Also see QA Scenarios: SDP_REQ-825 SDP_REQ-814 SDP_REQ-822
SDP_REQ-30	Graceful degradation	The failure of a single component should not cause the SDP to become unavailable.	

5.6.1. Quality Attribute Scenarios

Availability and other quality attributes are addressed through Quality Attribute Scenarios. A [Software RAM workshop](#) was held and several Quality Attribute Scenarios were developed. A framework for classification of failures was also used. [SDP Software Failure Options](#). The following Quality Attributes have been captured as L2 Requirements. These will continue to be used in further design and construction.

- SDP_REQ-822: Node failures recovery
- SDP_REQ-825: Monitoring to prevent critical failures
- SDP_REQ-811: Usability of SDP hardware
- SDP_REQ-810: Maintainability of Software
- SDP_REQ-814: Level of Monitoring
- SDP_REQ-739: Pipeline maintenance usability

6. Non-critical elements

Long Term Storage and Delivery are very important aspects of the SDP, although not critical for SDP availability as defined in section [5. SDP RAM Analysis](#). Failure in these (and other) non-critical products could also become critical failures if they are not identified and managed correctly. Therefore there are some constraints that apply to these products, although they are not directly derived from the $A_i = 99,9\%$. Failure handling is critical here.

The SDP L2 requirements [AD2] also contain a number of requirements meant to address architectural concerns and failure modes that were identified during failure analyses.

6.1. Constraints to prevent critical failures

This section lists failures that were considered, but not included in the A_i analysis. These failures should be included in lower level detail analysis to ensure reliability and availability.

The following could lead to unavailability of the Buffer or reduced Buffer capacity which would lead to SDP unavailability:

- If the processed data is not migrated from the Buffer to Long Term Storage, the capacity of the Buffer will be reduced causing a failure to receive new data. Constraints should be placed on these components to mitigate this failure mode.
- If the Batch Processing Component is unavailable it will cause a backlog of unprocessed data on the Buffer. This will result in reduced Buffer capacity available for receiving new data. Constraints should be placed on these components to mitigate this failure mode.

The reporting of Quality Assessment (QA) metrics to Telescope Manager is essential to ensure the quality of science output. Persistent failure to report Quality Assessment metrics will cause telescope operators (who monitor the QA metrics) to report SDP as unavailable. A constraint should be placed on the reliability of the Quality Assessment component to mitigate this failure mode.